90-Day Strategic Thinking Protocol: Apply Game Theory to Every High-Stakes Decision

How this programme adapts

Once a week, the player runs a short check-in and reads the week you actually logged — not the week the plan assumed. Every check-in lands on one of the adjustments below. These are the engine's own rules, rendered word for word.

Consolidation week
Consistency comes first. This week holds your current mapping depth exactly, with no new frameworks added until your logging rhythm is stable.
Add one mapping session
Low mapping volume suggests the daily habit needs reinforcing. This week adds two short mapping sessions to rebuild the routine before progressing.
Slow down and revisit
Low clarity scores suggest a framework step needs revisiting. This week holds pace and returns to the clearest example from your log before moving forward.
Ready for the next layer
Strong mapping volume and high clarity indicate the current frameworks are running automatically. This week reduces routine mapping by one session and introduces the next framework layer.
On track
Your mapping and clarity scores are in the normal range. This week holds pace and layers in the next scheduled framework step.

Pattern insights are gated behind your own record: the first unlocks after 5 logged days, and every insight states the evidence it stands on. Milestone reviews at day 30, day 60, day 90 read your whole record and choose their coaching from it.

The 90-day programme map

Every day of the programme, in full — the same steps the interactive player walks you through. Expand a week to read its days.

Month 1 — Foundation · Days 1–30

Build the core toolkit for reading and mapping strategic interactions

Week 1Payoff MappingDays 1–7

Day 1 · Draw Your First Payoff Matrix 10 min

Week 1 begins with the most fundamental skill in strategic thinking: mapping a situation before responding to it. A payoff matrix forces you to identify who the players are, what options each has, and what outcome follows from each combination of choices. This step alone changes how you see most negotiations and competitive situations.

Each day, sketch a quick payoff matrix for one real decision or interaction you encounter
Choose a current real decision, draw a simple 2x2 grid, label the two main players and their two options, and fill in rough outcomes for each combination

Day 2 · Name All the Players 10 min

A payoff matrix is only as good as your player list. In many real situations there are more than two parties, or the second player is an institution, a market, or a rule system rather than a person. Today you practice identifying everyone whose choices affect your outcome.

For today's matrix, list every party whose choices affect the outcome and note whether each is an individual, a group, or a system
Check whether any party you listed is actually multiple parties with conflicting interests, and if so split them into separate rows

Day 3 · Map the Outcomes 10 min

Precise payoff numbers are not the goal at this stage. You are learning to see how outcomes depend on the combination of choices, not just your own move. Today you practice rating each cell in your matrix: what does each combination produce for each player?

For today's matrix, rate each outcome for each player on a three-point scale: worse than their best outside option, neutral, or better
Circle any cell that is better for you no matter what the other player does, and note whether such a cell exists

Day 4 · The Pre-Engagement Scan 10 min

The payoff matrix is most valuable as a pre-engagement practice, not a post-mortem. Two minutes of structured thinking about players, options, and outcomes before a negotiation is a reliable preparation habit. Today you build that habit.

Before any negotiation or important conversation, identify who all the players are, write down their realistic options, and note what you think each side most values
Apply this pre-engagement scan to one upcoming conversation or decision today and note what it changes or confirms

Day 5 · The Other Player's Column 10 min

Your payoff matrix has your preferences in one column and theirs in another. Most people fill in their own column first and treat the other player's payoffs as a guess or an afterthought. Today you practice the other direction: fill in their column first, then yours.

For today's matrix, write the other player's likely payoffs before your own and note whether their preferences differ from what you initially assumed
Identify one thing the other party likely values that you had not previously factored into how you were approaching this situation

Day 6 · Find the Equilibrium 10 min

An equilibrium in your matrix is the point where neither player would switch given what the other is doing. Most real interactions settle near one. Seeing it explicitly helps you understand why a situation feels stable, why it feels stuck, or why it resolves in a particular way.

On today's matrix, mark each player's best response to each of the other player's options. The intersection of best responses is the equilibrium
Note whether the equilibrium outcome is the one both sides would prefer if they could coordinate, and what prevents them from reaching a better one

Day 7 · Week 1 Review 15 min

You have completed your first week of payoff mapping. The skill at this stage is not precision but repetition: getting comfortable drawing a rough matrix before responding to a situation. A quick review reveals what patterns have already appeared in your real decisions.

Review the six matrices you drew this week and note which was hardest to fill out accurately, and why
Write one sentence about a situation this week where drawing the matrix changed or confirmed your intended response

Week 2Nash EquilibriumDays 8–14

Day 8 · Scan for the Dominant Strategy 10 min

Week 2 sharpens your equilibrium analysis. A dominant strategy is one that gives you a better outcome no matter what the other player does. Spotting it first saves analysis time and clarifies your position before you reach any equilibrium calculation. Today you add this scan as a daily anchor.

When mapping any situation, scan for a dominant strategy first before calculating the equilibrium
Apply the dominant strategy scan to today's matrix and note whether a dominant option exists for you, for the other player, or for neither

Day 9 · When No One Dominates 10 min

Most real strategic situations do not have a dominant strategy for either player. When dominant strategies are absent, the equilibrium requires each side to reason about the other's best response. That reasoning is the core skill this week. Today you trace it out on a real situation.

Take today's mapped situation and trace the best-response logic: given what you expect them to do, what is your best move, and given that, what is their best response?
Write in plain language what the equilibrium of this situation is and whether you expect both parties to settle there

Day 10 · The Prisoner's Dilemma Structure 10 min

The prisoner's dilemma is one of the most common payoff structures in professional life. Its defining feature is that both players have a dominant strategy to defect, so both end up worse than if they had cooperated. Today you learn to recognize it.

Draw the classic prisoner's dilemma 2x2 matrix with cooperation and defection as the two options for each player
Find one situation in your professional or personal life with the same basic structure and write down which player you are and what each move corresponds to

Day 11 · Why Rational Players Get Stuck 10 min

The prisoner's dilemma is a trap for individually rational players. Each person following their dominant strategy produces a worse result for everyone than mutual cooperation would. Recognizing this structure in a real situation is the first step toward changing its outcome.

In the prisoner's dilemma situation you identified yesterday, trace through why each party's individually rational choice leads to a collectively worse outcome
Note one feature of that situation that could be changed to shift the structure away from a prisoner's dilemma toward a more cooperative outcome

Day 12 · Label Every Interaction 10 min

Not every interaction is adversarial, and treating a cooperative situation as zero-sum creates unnecessary conflict. A simple labeling habit, applied before you engage, helps you choose the right framework for each situation. Today you build that habit.

Label every new strategic interaction as zero-sum, positive-sum, or coordination before you engage with it
Apply the label to three recent interactions and note whether your original approach matched the actual game type

Day 13 · The Full Framework in One Sitting 15 min

You have learned payoff mapping, dominant strategy scanning, equilibrium tracing, prisoner's dilemma recognition, and game-type labeling. Today you apply all five steps to one real situation from start to finish. Doing them in sequence is the foundation of the protocol's practical drill.

Take one current negotiation or decision and apply the full sequence: identify players and options, label the game type, scan for dominant strategies, and trace the equilibrium
Note where you felt uncertain and write down a specific question that uncertainty raised about the situation

Day 14 · Week 2 Review 15 min

Two weeks of daily mapping have established the core analytical habits. A review reveals which game type appeared most often in your week and how your pre-engagement thinking has changed since day one.

Review your last 14 interaction log entries and note which game type appeared most frequently in your situations
Compare your day-14 matrix quality with your day-1 matrix and note one concrete difference in how you are now filling it out

Week 3Game TypesDays 15–21

Day 15 · Zero-Sum Thinking, Checked 10 min

Week 3 examines the three main game types in depth. Zero-sum means one player's gain is exactly the other's loss, with no total surplus to share. This structure is rarer in real life than it appears, because most negotiations have joint possibilities that purely adversarial thinking misses. Today you check your zero-sum assumptions against the evidence.

Take one interaction you labeled zero-sum this week and look for any shared-value element: a timing preference, a risk tolerance, or a secondary issue where both sides could gain
Note whether reframing the interaction as partly positive-sum would change your planned approach, and how

Day 16 · The Interaction Log 10 min

Week 3 introduces your strategic log: a single running record with three labeled sections — Interaction, Trust, and Field — that you will build across the programme. Starting today, the Interaction section is open: write down the situation type, your move, and the result for each significant strategic exchange. Two minutes per entry builds a personal dataset of how your strategic behavior plays out over time.

Add one entry to the Interaction section of your strategic log each day: note the situation type, your move, and what happened
Open your strategic log today, create the three sections (Interaction, Trust, and Field), and make your first Interaction entry by picking your most significant strategic exchange, classifying it, and noting what you did and the result

Day 17 · Positive-Sum Possibilities 10 min

Positive-sum situations have room for both sides to gain relative to their best outside alternative. Most professional negotiations have this structure when longer-run considerations are included. Today you practice actively looking for the positive-sum layer in situations that first appear competitive.

Take a current negotiation or dispute and list every dimension where both parties could simultaneously benefit from a different arrangement
Note what would need to change in how the conversation is framed to make that positive-sum dimension visible to both sides

Day 18 · Coordination Games 10 min

A coordination game is one where both players benefit from choosing the same option or aligning on a shared standard, but where more than one alignment point is possible. Traffic sides, currency choices, and meeting-time agreements are all coordination games. Today you find one in your own life.

Identify one coordination game you currently face: a situation where the main challenge is aligning with others, not outcompeting them
Note what makes coordination easy or hard in that specific situation, and whether there is a natural standard or convention already in play

Day 19 · Mixed-Type Situations 10 min

Real strategic situations rarely fit perfectly into one category. A business partnership can be positive-sum at the level of the deal and competitive in the distribution of gains. A negotiation can be cooperative on one dimension and adversarial on another. Today you practice reading that complexity.

Identify one current interaction that has both competitive and cooperative elements and map each element separately
Note at which stage of the interaction the cooperative logic dominates and at which stage the competitive logic takes over

Day 20 · The Full Taxonomy Review 10 min

You now have a working vocabulary for strategic situations: zero-sum, positive-sum, coordination, and prisoner's dilemma. Applying these labels before engaging is the core meta-habit of this programme. Today you review your interaction log with fresh eyes and check your labels.

Look back through your interaction log and relabel each entry using all four types you now know
Note whether changing the time horizon of any interaction changes its classification, and write down one example where it does

Day 21 · Week 3 Review 15 min

Three weeks in, your daily mapping and labeling habits are established. Week 4 moves from analysis to dynamics: how games change when the same two parties interact repeatedly. Before that, a quick review closes out the foundation week for game types.

Identify the single most important interaction of week 3 and write down how your game-type label shaped or should have shaped your response
Note which of the four game types you found hardest to distinguish in practice and mark it as a focus area for month 2

Week 4The Prisoner's DilemmaDays 22–30

Day 22 · The Shadow of the Future 10 min

The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not another category to label — it is the engine driving most real cooperation failures. This week you go inside one type rather than across all types. Whether you interact with someone once or many times changes the game fundamentally. In a one-shot interaction, defection is rational if you expect the other side to defect. In a repeated relationship, the prospect of future interactions makes cooperation a viable long-run strategy. Today you build the habit of asking which situation you are in.

For any recurring relationship, ask yourself before responding whether you will interact with this person again, and how that answer affects your move
Apply this question to two ongoing professional or personal relationships and note whether it changes your planned approach to anything current

Day 23 · The Logic of One-Shot Defection 10 min

Defection in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma is individually rational: if you do not expect to see the other party again and cooperation is not enforced, defecting protects you from exploitation. Understanding why defection is logical in this structure is the first step toward recognizing when cooperation is the stronger play instead.

Map a real one-shot situation you have encountered and trace through why defection was rational from each side's perspective
Note whether the interaction was genuinely one-shot or whether you or the other party had some stake in reputation beyond this specific exchange

Day 24 · When Cooperation Emerges 10 min

Axelrod's tournament results showed that tit-for-tat, a simple reciprocal strategy, outperformed complex strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma play. The conditions for its success are worth knowing: repeated interaction, observable history, and reversible defection. Today you check whether those conditions hold in your key relationships.

Write down the three conditions for tit-for-tat success: repeated interaction, observable history, and reversible defection
For your most important recurring professional relationship, note whether each condition holds and identify which is weakest

Day 25 · Your Repeated Games 15 min

Most significant relationships in professional life are repeated games. Identifying them explicitly, and noting whether each is currently being played cooperatively, is a practical audit of your strategic situation. Today you map that list.

List your five most strategically significant repeated relationships at work or at home
For each, note whether the current dynamic is primarily cooperative, defecting, or uncertain, and write one sentence about what sustains that dynamic

Day 26 · The Long Shadow 10 min

In relationships with a very long shadow of the future, even a small temptation to defect today is outweighed by the long-run cost of breaking a cooperative pattern. Recognizing when you have that long shadow makes the calculus clear. Today you map what long-run cooperation would look like concretely in one key relationship.

For one key repeated relationship, map what sustained cooperation would look like: what each side does, what each side refrains from doing, and what signal each side sends
Note one small first cooperative move you could make this week that is low-cost but clearly visible to the other party

Day 27 · Forgiveness in Tit-for-Tat 10 min

Pure tit-for-tat responds in kind: cooperate if they cooperated last time, defect if they defected. In practice, a single misread can start a defection spiral. Adding occasional forgiveness, cooperating even after a defection, interrupts that spiral and is more robust in real-world conditions.

Identify one professional relationship where a past defection has shifted the dynamic away from cooperation
Consider whether a single cooperative move from you, at low personal cost, might reset the pattern, and note why you would or would not take it

Day 28 · Defection Recovery 10 min

When one party defects once and then returns to cooperation, can the relationship recover? In many repeated games it can, especially when the defection was clear, the return to cooperation is equally clear, and neither side has a reason to hold the defection permanently. Today you trace a real example.

Recall a situation where you or another party defected once and then resumed cooperation and trace what allowed the recovery
Note one feature of that recovery that you could replicate deliberately in a current relationship where trust has recently dipped

Day 29 · Month 1 Integration 15 min

You are near the close of Month 1. Your daily mapping and labeling habits are running. You have mapped the prisoner's dilemma, identified your repeated games, and traced the logic of cooperation and defection. Today you synthesize across those four weeks before Month 2 shifts toward applying the framework in live interactions.

Review your interaction log from weeks 1 through 4 and identify the interaction type that appeared most often and the one that gave you the most analytical difficulty
Write down one game you have been playing suboptimally and the specific adjustment you plan to make in Month 2

Day 30 · Camp I: Foundation Complete 15 min

Day 30. You have completed the Foundation phase. Payoff mapping is a daily habit. You can label game types, identify dominant strategies, and recognize the prisoner's dilemma structure. Month 2 builds application skills on top of this foundation, moving from analysis on paper to live interactions.

Write one working definition each for payoff matrix, dominant strategy, game type, and the shadow of the future, in your own words
Note which of the four framework areas still feels least settled and flag it as a priority review target for the first week of Month 2

Month 2 — Optimisation · Days 31–60

Apply game theory frameworks to real negotiations and repeated relationships

Week 5Iterated Games and ReputationDays 31–37

Day 31 · Write Down What They Want 10 min

Week 5 begins with a new anchor: before any response in a negotiation, pause and write down what you believe the other side most wants from this interaction. It sounds simple, but most people skip it. The discipline of writing it down forces you to check your model of the other party before you move.

Before any response in a negotiation, write down what you believe the other side most wants from the interaction
Apply this habit to one real negotiation or discussion today and note whether your written model matched how they actually behaved

Day 32 · Tit-for-Tat in Practice 10 min

Tit-for-tat is not a theory, it is a behavioral pattern: start by cooperating, then respond in kind to whatever the other party did last time, and forgive occasionally. The power of this pattern comes from its clarity: the other party can see what you are doing, which makes it self-enforcing.

Identify one relationship where you could cleanly apply a tit-for-tat approach starting this week
Write down your first concrete cooperative move and what tit-for-tat says about your next response if they cooperate or if they defect

Day 33 · What Your Behavior Signals 10 min

Your strategic behavior sends signals beyond any single transaction. Over repeated interactions, the other party develops a model of you: are you predictable? Are you responsive to cooperation? Do you follow through? Today you audit the signals your current behavior is sending to your most important counterparts.

List three things your behavior in recent interactions signals to the people you deal with most often
Identify one signal you are sending that you did not intend to send, and note what a change in behavior would send instead

Day 34 · The Free-Rider Problem 10 min

In any group with shared resources or joint projects, some parties contribute less than their proportionate share. This free-rider dynamic is a public-goods version of the prisoner's dilemma. Understanding it structurally, rather than attributing it purely to character, changes how you design incentives and norms.

Identify one group interaction in your professional life where free riding is occurring or likely to occur
Note what mechanism, if any, currently discourages it, and whether that mechanism is working as intended

Day 35 · Institutional Solutions 10 min

One reason cooperation is possible in modern organizations is that contracts, rules, and norms do much of the work. These institutional solutions change the payoff structure by making defection costly. Today you look at the institutions in your own work that serve this function.

Identify one rule, contract, or professional norm in your work that enforces cooperation that would otherwise break down
Note whether that mechanism is functioning as intended, and if not, what is undermining it

Day 36 · Altruistic Punishment 10 min

Research on public goods games found that people regularly punish free riders even when the punishment costs them personally and produces no direct material benefit. This norm-enforcing behavior shapes workplace and social dynamics in ways that purely self-interested models miss. Today you find an example in your own context.

Identify a situation in your professional or social life where someone incurred a personal cost to enforce a norm against a violator
Note what norm was being enforced and whether the action had the effect of discouraging future violations

Day 37 · Week 5 Review 15 min

Week 5 moved from cooperation theory to cooperation practice: tit-for-tat, signaling, free-rider dynamics, institutional enforcement, and altruistic punishment. Each of these shows up in the interactions you mapped. A review closes the week; next, trust and how it is built and signalled.

Look through your interaction log entries from this week and identify which entries involved the shadow of the future and which did not
Write down one concrete behavior change you plan to make in your most important repeated relationship based on this week's work

Week 6Trust and ReciprocityDays 38–44

Day 38 · The Trust-Signal Log 10 min

Week 6 focuses on trust: how it is built, read, and maintained in real relationships. This week you activate the Trust section of your strategic log: after each day's most important interaction, add one trust-relevant signal to that section. You are building a record of what trust-building and trust-breaking behavior actually looks like in your specific context.

Add one trust-relevant signal to the Trust section of your strategic log after each day's most important interaction
Open the Trust section of your strategic log and make your first entry today: describe the interaction, the signal you observed, and whether it was trust-building or trust-eroding

Day 39 · The Investment Decision 10 min

The trust game from experimental economics captures the investment logic of real relationships. A sender transfers a resource, which grows in value as it moves, and the receiver decides what to return. How much you send signals how much trust you extend. What comes back tells you whether that trust was warranted.

Map one recent interaction using the trust game frame: who was the sender, what did they transfer, and how much of the grown value came back?
Note whether the return matched the sender's implicit expectation and what signal that sent about the relationship's future

Day 40 · Reciprocity Norms 10 min

Reciprocity operates as a social norm: people feel obligated to return favors and to respond proportionately to both generosity and hostility. This norm is powerful precisely because it runs before strategic calculation, as a near-automatic response. Recognizing when reciprocity is driving your behavior versus rational self-interest improves your awareness as a strategic actor.

Identify one recent situation where you felt obligated to return a favor, a concession, or a hostile move, and trace what triggered that sense of obligation
Note whether your reciprocity response was proportionate to the original signal, and whether a deliberate override would have produced a better result

Day 41 · The Ultimatum and Fairness 10 min

Ultimatum game experiments show that people regularly reject splits they consider unfair even at personal cost. This means that purely material calculations miss something real: procedural fairness matters. The framing of an offer, the process by which it was reached, and what it signals about the relationship all carry strategic weight.

Identify a recent negotiation that had the structure of an ultimatum: one party proposed a split and the other decided whether to accept
Note whether the offer was accepted or rejected, whether fairness was a factor in that decision, and what the outcome tells you about how that relationship should be managed

Day 42 · Unconditional Cooperators 10 min

In any social or professional network, some people tend to cooperate first without waiting for proof of trustworthiness. They bear the short-run risk of being exploited in exchange for establishing a cooperative norm quickly. Understanding this strategy, and deciding whether it fits your context, is a practical choice.

Identify one person in your professional network who tends to extend trust first and note whether this approach has served them well in the interactions you have observed
Reflect on whether your own default leans toward extending trust first or waiting for signals, and note the main cost of each approach in your specific context

Day 43 · Trust Calibration 10 min

A trust heuristic is a rule you use to decide how much to invest in a new relationship. Some common ones are: trust people who come with a strong referral, trust people who bear visible costs to signal reliability, or trust organizations that put meaningful deposits at risk. Today you examine your own heuristics.

Write down the two or three heuristics you most rely on when deciding whether to trust a new counterpart
Check each heuristic against your trust-signal log from this week and note whether they are picking up the signals you actually find reliable in practice

Day 44 · Week 6 Review 15 min

Week 6 covered trust games, reciprocity norms, ultimatum fairness, and trust heuristics. Trust is not a fixed quantity in a relationship: it accumulates or erodes with each interaction. A review identifies one relationship where you have the most to gain from deliberately building trust.

Pick your most trust-sensitive professional relationship and map its current state using the trust game frame: what have you sent, what has come back, and what is the current equilibrium?
Note one specific action in the coming week that would visibly signal trustworthiness at modest cost to you

Week 7Coordination and Focal PointsDays 45–51

Day 45 · The Focal Point Scan 10 min

Week 7 focuses on coordination: situations where success depends on aligning with others, not outcompeting them. Your new anchor is a pre-conversation scan for the natural focal point, the option that stands out as obvious or conventional without discussion. Learning to find it before you engage makes coordination faster and less contentious.

Before any coordination-dependent conversation, identify the most naturally prominent option available to both parties
Apply this scan to one coordination challenge you are currently navigating and note what the natural focal point appears to be

Day 46 · Why Focal Points Work 10 min

Schelling's insight was that people in a coordination game independently converge on the same option because it is culturally or structurally salient, not because it is materially superior. The 'obviousness' of an option is socially constructed, but it is real and reliable. Today you find the focal points that operate in your own professional context.

Identify two industry standards, professional conventions, or social norms that function as focal points in your work, meaning they are the default option everyone expects others to choose
Note one case where the entrenched focal point is actively unhelpful and both parties are stuck on it even though a better alignment is available

Day 47 · Making Your Option More Salient 10 min

When you want others to coordinate on a particular option, making it more visible and labeling it as the natural choice is often more reliable than arguing for it on its merits. Salience operates before deliberation. Today you practice designing salience.

For one current coordination challenge, identify how you could frame your preferred option to make it more naturally prominent to the other parties
Note whether there is an existing convention or reference point you could anchor your option to, making it feel like the obvious extension of something already shared rather than a new proposal

Day 48 · When Focal Points Fail 10 min

Focal points fail when no option is obviously more salient than the others, when different parties have different cultural backgrounds that make different options obvious, or when past experience has established conflicting precedents. Recognizing when you are in that situation prevents you from assuming convergence that will not happen.

Identify a past coordination failure from your experience and note what made it hard to find a shared focal point
Write down what information or convention, had it existed, would have created the missing salience and allowed coordination to succeed

Day 49 · Cheap Talk and Coordination 10 min

Communication before a coordination game is cheap talk: it is not binding and cannot be verified. Yet it often works. When both parties benefit from the same alignment and there is no conflict about which option to align on, communication can establish a focal point even without commitment. Today you find this structure in your own experience.

Identify a recent coordination that succeeded because of a brief pre-game communication: a quick message, a heads-up, or an offhand mention of your plan
Note what made that communication credible enough to work even though it was not binding

Day 50 · Multiple Equilibria 10 min

A coordination game with multiple equilibria can settle at any of them. History, convention, and precedent often determine which one is reached, and once one is established, switching requires costly re-coordination. Understanding how a particular equilibrium was reached helps you decide whether to reinforce it or invest in switching.

Identify one coordination equilibrium in your professional context that was reached historically and is now entrenched, even though a better option is available
Estimate the switching cost: what would it take in communication, effort, or goodwill to move both parties to the better coordination point?

Day 51 · Week 7 Review 15 min

Week 7 covered focal points, salience, cheap talk, and multi-equilibrium coordination. The core lesson is that you do not need to persuade people on the merits when you can make one option naturally obvious. A review closes the week; next, sequential reasoning and the decision tree.

Identify the coordination challenge from this week where applying the focal point scan made the biggest practical difference
Write down one lesson about what makes a focal point effective in your specific professional context

Week 8Backward InductionDays 52–60

Day 52 · The Decision Tree 10 min

Week 8 introduces sequential reasoning: thinking through multi-stage negotiations and decisions by mapping them as trees before you start. Your new anchor is sketching a simple decision tree for any negotiation with more than one stage. This prevents you from making first moves that look good locally but set up a worse position later.

For any multi-stage negotiation or decision, sketch a simple sequential tree before making your first move
Draw a tree for one current negotiation with at least two stages, labeling the decision nodes and the plausible outcomes at each stage

Day 53 · Start at the End 10 min

Backward induction means starting from the terminal node of your decision tree and working back. At the last decision node, each player will choose their best option given where they are. One step back, each player anticipates that final choice and chooses accordingly. Today you trace this logic from end to start.

Take yesterday's decision tree and work backward from the last stage: what will each party rationally choose at the final node, and what does that imply for the second-to-last stage?
Trace the full backward induction path back to the first decision and note what first move it implies

Day 54 · Anticipating Two Moves Ahead 10 min

You do not need to trace every possible branch of a tree to get value from sequential reasoning. Two moves ahead is usually enough for practical decisions: what will my move now trigger, and what will their response to that trigger? Today you practice this limited but reliable version of forward planning.

Before making a response in one real negotiation today, map out the two most likely responses to your move and your best response to each of those
Note whether thinking two moves ahead changed your planned opening move, and if so, how

Day 55 · Credibility at Every Stage 10 min

A strategy is credible across a sequential game if it is rational at every stage, not just at the start. Threats and commitments that would not rationally be carried through at the relevant stage are not credible, even if announced at the beginning. Today you audit one commitment for this property.

Take one current threat or commitment you have made and ask: at the stage when you would need to follow through, would it actually be in your interest to do so?
Note whether the commitment is credible in this sense, and if not, what a more credible alternative would look like

Day 56 · Threats That Hold 10 min

A threat works when the threatened party believes you would carry it out. That belief depends on whether following through is rational at the moment it matters. Many threats fail not because they are bluffs but because both parties know the cost of following through exceeds the cost of backing down.

Identify a threat or ultimatum you have issued or received recently and test whether carrying it out would have been rational for the issuing party at the moment it mattered
Note whether the threat worked, and whether its effectiveness was related to its credibility or to some other factor

Day 57 · First-Mover Advantage and Disadvantage 10 min

Moving first is not always better. In some games, moving first commits you to a strategy that the second mover can exploit by responding optimally. In others, moving first lets you set the terms and anchor the negotiation. Today you distinguish these two structures in your real situations.

Identify one ongoing situation where moving first is an advantage and note why: what does the commitment or early disclosure accomplish?
Identify one situation where moving second is better and note why: what information or flexibility does waiting preserve?

Day 58 · When to Reveal 10 min

In sequential negotiations, when you reveal your preferences matters as much as what you reveal. Disclosing your reservation price or ideal outcome too early anchors your counterpart's expectations in your favor or against it, depending on the situation. Today you think through the timing of information disclosure in one current negotiation.

For one current negotiation, map when each piece of information about your preferences should ideally be revealed and why
Note one piece of information you have been withholding and assess whether revealing it earlier would strengthen or weaken your position

Day 59 · Integration Day 15 min

You have now covered payoff mapping, game types, cooperation dynamics, trust, coordination, and sequential reasoning. Today you apply all six frameworks to one complex real situation. This is a full-stack analysis: the kind of structured thinking this programme trains you to do automatically.

Take the most complex strategic situation you are currently managing and apply all six frameworks: label the game type, map payoffs, identify the cooperation structure, read the trust signals, find the focal point, and sketch the decision tree
Note which framework gave you the most new information and which you found hardest to apply in this specific situation

Day 60 · Camp II: Optimisation Complete 15 min

Day 60. Month 2 is complete. You have moved from mapping to application: tit-for-tat in practice, trust-signal reading, coordination by design, and sequential game analysis. Month 3 integrates these across complex and ambiguous real situations.

Review your interaction log from month 2 and identify three situations where applying a framework changed your approach compared to your instinctive response
Flag any of the six frameworks you have not yet used in a live situation and mark it as a Month 3 priority

Month 3 — Mastery · Days 61–90

Integrate all six frameworks into a personal strategic reasoning practice

Week 9Mixed Strategies and Level-kDays 61–67

Day 61 · When to Be Unpredictable 10 min

Week 9 introduces two related ideas: mixed strategies and level-k reasoning. A mixed strategy is a deliberate choice to vary your moves rather than committing to a single approach. It is rational when your predictability makes you exploitable. Today you identify one situation in your professional life where predictability is a liability.

Identify a situation in your professional life where the other party has learned your pattern and is exploiting it
Note what varying your approach would look like in practice: what is the simplest change that would make you harder to predict without undermining your core objective?

Day 62 · The Level-k Framework 10 min

Level-k thinking describes how strategically sophisticated a player is. A level-0 player ignores others' reasoning. A level-1 player best-responds to level-0. A level-2 player best-responds to level-1. In practice, most people operate between level 1 and level 2, which means reasoning two or three levels ahead often gives you an edge over typical counterparts.

Write in your own words what it means to think at level 1, level 2, and level 3 in a negotiation
Identify one recent interaction and estimate at what level both you and the other party were reasoning

Day 63 · Estimating Their Level 10 min

Estimating another person's reasoning level is a practical skill built from observation over time. Signals include how they respond to your moves, whether their strategy changes when you change yours, and whether their behavior looks more like random play or optimized response. Today you build this estimation habit.

For three key relationships in your professional life, estimate the rough reasoning level the other party typically applies
Note one way each estimate, if correct, should change your approach in that relationship

Day 64 · Introducing Variation 10 min

A mixed strategy does not mean random. It means choosing from a set of moves in proportions that make you harder to predict, or simply varying enough to prevent easy exploitation. Today you design a simple variation for one strategic context where your pattern has become too readable.

For one negotiation or competitive interaction where the other side has learned your pattern, design a simple rotation: two or three approaches you can vary between without abandoning your core objective
Note what signals will guide which approach to use in any given instance

Day 65 · The Matching Pennies Structure 10 min

Matching pennies is the simplest pure-conflict game: one player wins if both choose the same side, the other wins if they differ. There is no pure-strategy equilibrium. In practice, any negotiation where one party gains from predictability and the other gains from surprise has this structure embedded within it.

Draw the matching pennies matrix and identify one real interaction where interests are directly opposed in this way
Note how the absence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in that interaction plays out in practice: is it resolved by convention, by iteration, or by a persistent back-and-forth dynamic?

Day 66 · Cognitive Hierarchy in Groups 10 min

In group decisions, different members reason at different strategic levels. The group outcome is not determined by the most sophisticated member but by the interaction of all their strategies. Knowing where you sit in that distribution and where the group tends to settle shapes how you invest your reasoning effort.

Identify a recent group decision where different members were clearly thinking at different strategic levels
Note whether the outcome reflected the most sophisticated reasoning available or something closer to the average, and what that implies for how you contribute to group strategy

Day 67 · Week 9 Review 15 min

Week 9 covered mixed strategies and level-k reasoning, two tools for situations where predictability is a liability. A review closes the week; next, credible commitments and how signals hold under pressure.

Pick the most strategically complex interaction of week 9 and identify at what level you were reasoning
Note one situation where reasoning one level higher than your counterpart would have changed your approach and what you would have done differently

Week 10Credible CommitmentsDays 68–74

Day 68 · The Credibility Check 10 min

Week 10 returns to sequential reasoning with a focus on commitments. A commitment is credible when following through is rational at the moment it matters. Today you build the habit of asking that question before every commitment you make. Commitments that fail at later stages erode your strategic position over time.

Before making any commitment, ask yourself: could you realistically follow through on this at every later stage where it matters?
Apply this check to one current active commitment and assess whether it passes

Day 69 · Binding Mechanisms 10 min

A binding mechanism makes a commitment credible by raising the cost of backing down: contracts, deposits, public announcements, or structural constraints. When a commitment lacks a binding mechanism, it is only as good as your counterpart's belief in your willingness to follow through.

Identify one current commitment in your professional life that is made credible by a formal mechanism
Identify one commitment that lacks a binding mechanism and consider whether adding one would serve your interests, and what form that mechanism might take

Day 70 · The Value of Irreversibility 10 min

Making a commitment irreversible, or making retreat demonstrably costly, is not always a mistake. In some games, removing your own option to back down makes your commitment more credible to the other party, which can secure a better outcome than a reversible commitment would. Today you trace this logic in a real example.

Identify one situation where making a decision irreversible, or announcing it publicly, would strengthen your position by demonstrating commitment
Note what you give up by removing the retreat option, and whether the credibility gain outweighs that cost in this specific situation

Day 71 · Moving First With Intent 10 min

A first move in a sequential game is not just an opening position. It is a signal about your strategy and a constraint on your future moves. A commitment made first and publicly anchors the negotiation on your terms if your counterpart takes it as given. Today you consider where that logic applies in your current negotiations.

Identify one upcoming negotiation where committing to your position publicly and early would lock in an advantage
Note what that commitment would signal and whether it leaves enough flexibility for what you might need as the negotiation proceeds

Day 72 · Weak Promises 10 min

A promise that is cheap to break is weakly credible. The other party's expectation of your follow-through is calibrated by their observation of whether your past promises held when they became costly. Weak promises accumulate into a pattern that undercuts your strategic position in future interactions.

List three recent commitments you have made in professional settings and rate each: how costly was it for you to maintain it when the moment came?
Identify one pattern in when your commitments hold and when they weaken, and note one change that would make your next commitment more consistently binding

Day 73 · Reputation as Commitment 10 min

Over time, consistent follow-through builds a reputation for reliability that functions as a standing commitment. People make larger investments when dealing with you because they have a track record to rely on. Today you assess the reputation you have built and how it shapes your current strategic position.

Identify one professional relationship where your reputation for follow-through is functioning as a credible commitment that you can draw on
Note one recent action that either strengthened or weakened that reputation, and what a pattern of similar actions over the next month would signal

Day 74 · Week 10 Review 15 min

Week 10 covered binding mechanisms, irreversible commitments, first moves, promise calibration, and reputation. The through-line is that commitments are credible in proportion to the observable cost of breaking them. A review closes the week; next, you take the frameworks into the field.

Review the commitments you made and observed this week and rank them from most to least credible
Identify your single most credible current commitment and your single least credible one, and write down what makes the difference

Week 11Real-World ApplicationDays 75–81

Day 75 · Field Notes 10 min

Week 11 is your real-world application week. Each day you take one of the six frameworks and apply it in full depth to a live situation. This week you activate the Field section of your strategic log: each day, record one specific real-world strategic pattern you observed. These entries are the raw material for your Month 3 synthesis.

Add one real-world strategic pattern to the Field section of your strategic log each day
Open the Field section of your strategic log and make your first entry today: describe one specific example from the day that maps onto any of the six frameworks you have studied

Day 76 · Full Negotiation Analysis 15 min

Today you apply the payoff mapping and equilibrium framework to one real current negotiation in full depth: not as a five-minute pre-engagement scan but as a deliberate analysis. The goal is fluency at depth, not just at speed.

Take one active negotiation and map it completely: identify all players, their realistic options, rough payoffs for each combination, dominant strategies if any, and the current equilibrium
Note which element of the analysis gave you the most new information and whether it changes your planned approach

Day 77 · The Coordination Challenge 15 min

Today you apply the focal point framework in full to the most difficult coordination challenge you are currently facing. The aim is to move from naming the problem to identifying the specific salience mechanism that could resolve it.

Map the coordination challenge in full: who needs to align, what options are available, what is the natural focal point, and what is preventing convergence on it?
Draft a one-sentence framing of your preferred option that makes it feel more natural and prominent to the other parties

Day 78 · Trust Audit 15 min

Today you review your trust-signal log from the past 40 days and look for patterns in how trust is built and broken in your most important relationships. Pattern recognition across many entries is more reliable than any single data point.

Review your trust-signal log entries and identify three recurring patterns in what signals you find trustworthy in practice
Identify the relationship in your log where trust has shifted most significantly over the past 40 days and note the specific events that drove that shift

Day 79 · The Cooperation Inventory 15 min

Today you map all your significant ongoing relationships on a cooperation axis: which are running cooperatively, which have defection dynamics, and which are mixed or unclear. A full inventory surfaces patterns that individual interactions obscure.

Map your significant ongoing relationships and classify each as cooperative, defecting, or mixed, with one sentence of evidence for each classification
Identify one stuck defection cycle and write down a specific first cooperative move you could make this week at low personal cost

Day 80 · Sequential Complexity 15 min

Today you apply backward induction to the most sequential game you are currently playing: the one with the most stages and the longest time horizon. Depth of analysis is the goal today, not breadth.

Draw the decision tree for your most sequential current situation, working out at least three stages forward
Apply backward induction from the terminal nodes back to today and note what first move it implies for your next interaction

Day 81 · Level-k Self-Assessment 15 min

Today you assess the strategic reasoning levels operating in your most important relationships, including your own. A realistic self-assessment is the foundation of any useful level-k analysis.

For your three most important professional relationships, estimate the reasoning level each party typically applies based on your observations over the past three months
Identify one interaction this week where you can deliberately reason one level higher than your counterpart and note what that higher-level response would look like

Week 12SynthesisDays 82–90

Day 82 · Your Strategic Fingerprint 15 min

Week 12 is synthesis. Over 82 days you have built a toolkit and a personal dataset. Today you describe your default strategic style: the patterns in how you map and respond to situations. Naming those patterns is the first step to refining them intentionally.

Write a brief description of your default strategic approach: how you enter a negotiation, what you tend to map first, and how you typically respond to cooperation or defection
Note two tendencies that have served you well and one that you plan to continue developing over the months ahead

Day 83 · The Cooperation Question 15 min

On day 83, you return to the cooperation framework with the full depth of the programme behind you. Today you map your most important recurring relationship using the complete cooperation structure, from shadow of the future to current equilibrium.

Map your most important recurring professional relationship using the full cooperation framework: repeated game, shadow of the future, tit-for-tat pattern, and current equilibrium
Plan one concrete action this week based on that analysis

Day 84 · Three Situations, Three Labels 15 min

Today you apply game-type labeling and equilibrium analysis to three real current situations in a single session. The goal is fluency, not depth: moving through the framework quickly enough to use it as a real-time analytical lens.

Map three distinct current situations, labeling each with game type, shadow of the future, and approximate current equilibrium
Note whether any of the three is misclassified in your habitual mental model and what difference the correct label makes

Day 85 · Trust and the Long Game 15 min

Today you assess the trust status of your five most important professional relationships, with your full trust framework applied. The quality of this assessment reflects 85 days of trust-signal observation.

For each of your five most important professional relationships, rate the current trust level and note the most recent trust-relevant event that affected it
Identify one high-leverage trust-building action you could take this week in your most important relationship

Day 86 · Coordination for the Group 15 min

Today you map the most significant coordination challenge facing your team or household this month, applying the focal point framework in full. Group coordination often requires making one option not just available but obvious.

Map the coordination challenge: who needs to align, on what, and what are the competing focal points or conventions currently in play?
Draft a one-sentence framing that makes the best available alignment option more salient and more obvious to all parties involved

Day 87 · Your Commitment Portfolio 15 min

Today you review all the active commitments you are currently carrying and assess each for credibility. A commitment portfolio that is mostly credible is a strategic asset. One with several weak commitments is a liability, because it trains counterparts to discount your future words.

List all active commitments you have made that are functioning as strategic signals and rate each for credibility
Identify any commitment that needs reinforcement and write down a specific step to strengthen it before the end of the week

Day 88 · Level-k Calibration 15 min

Today you review your field notes from the past two weeks and update your estimates of the strategic reasoning levels in your key relationships. Calibration is an ongoing process: new evidence should revise prior estimates.

Review your field notes from the past 14 days and note any updates to your reasoning-level estimates for your key relationships
Identify one upcoming interaction where you plan to reason one level higher than your counterpart and write down what that response will look like concretely

Day 89 · The Playbook 15 min

Day 89. One day from the summit. Today you write a personal strategic playbook: a one-page summary of your core approach that you can return to in any high-stakes situation. It is drawn entirely from your own 89 days of practice, not from abstract principles.

Write a one-page strategic playbook covering: how you map a new situation, which framework you reach for first, your cooperation defaults in recurring relationships, your commitment style, and your trust-reading process
Note two specific areas you plan to continue developing beyond this 90-day programme

Day 90 · Summit: 90 Days Complete 15 min

Day 90. The summit. You have built a complete toolkit for strategic-interaction reasoning across six frameworks, practiced it across 90 days of real situations, and assembled a personal dataset of how that reasoning plays out in your specific context. The programme is complete. The practice continues.

Review your complete 90-day strategic log and identify the single interaction where applying a game theory framework produced the biggest shift in your thinking or approach
Note the next situation where you plan to apply the full toolkit and write down your opening analysis

The evidence

The frameworks this programme is built on — each anchored to peer-reviewed research, cited with its DOI and verified against the Crossref registry at build time. Where the evidence has honest limits, the framework says so.

Payoff Mapping and Nash Equilibrium

Nash · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 1950

The mathematical foundation of strategic analysis: mapping each player's options and outcomes into a payoff matrix and identifying equilibria where no party can improve their outcome by changing strategy alone. Provides a portable, claim-free structure for reading any negotiation, competitive situation, or shared decision before engaging.

DOI: 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48

Goeree & Holt, 2001 — Ten experimental games illustrating where standard Nash predictions hold and where bounded rationality produces systematic deviations doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1402

Iterated Cooperation and Reciprocity

Axelrod, Hamilton · Science · 1981

In repeated interactions, simple reciprocal strategies can sustain cooperation without central enforcement. The shadow of future interaction changes incentives: knowing a relationship continues shapes rational choices toward cooperation over one-shot defection. Tit-for-tat and its variants are among the most robust strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments.

DOI: 10.1126/science.7466396

Dal Bo, 2005 — Experimental evidence that longer shadow of the future increases cooperation rates in repeated prisoner's dilemma games doi:10.1257/000282805775014434
Fehr & Gachter, 2000 — Altruistic punishment sustains public-goods cooperation even when institutional enforcement is absent doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980

Cognitive Hierarchy and Level-k Reasoning

Camerer, Ho, Chong · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2004

People reason about others' reasoning in discrete levels. A level-1 thinker best-responds to random play; a level-2 thinker assumes they face level-1 opponents. Most real decision-makers operate at level 1 or 2, making it practical to calibrate your strategic moves by estimating the reasoning level of your counterpart rather than assuming full rationality.

DOI: 10.1162/0033553041502225

Stahl & Wilson, 1995 — Experimental evidence for bounded strategic rationality and heterogeneous reasoning levels in normal-form games doi:10.1006/game.1995.1031

Trust, Reciprocity, and Fairness Norms

Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe · Games and Economic Behavior · 1995

The trust game captures a core reciprocity dynamic present in most professional relationships: a sender's investment signals trust, and the receiver's return signals trustworthiness. Fairness norms revealed in ultimatum experiments show that people weigh procedural fairness alongside material outcomes, making the framing and process of an offer strategically relevant.

DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1027

Guth et al., 1982 — Ultimatum bargaining experiment establishing the empirical foundation for fairness-motivated rejection of low offers in economic decisions doi:10.1016/0167-2681(82)90011-7

Focal Points and Coordination

Mehta, Starmer, Sugden · Theory and Decision · 1994

When parties need to align without explicit communication, they tend to converge on options that are culturally salient or structurally prominent. Schelling called these focal points. Experimental evidence confirms that salience, rather than material superiority, drives independent convergence. Understanding what makes an option prominent allows you to propose and identify natural coordination solutions.

DOI: 10.1007/bf01079211

Backward Induction and Credible Commitments

Johnson, Camerer, Sen, Rymon · Journal of Economic Theory · 2002

In sequential games, rational play requires reasoning from the final decision back to the first move. Commitments are credible only when the committer has a rational reason to follow through at every later stage. Information-search process-tracing data reveal that even experienced negotiators often fail to apply backward induction fully, making this a high-value skill to develop deliberately.

DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2850

Safety & fit

This 90-day protocol is a structured, educational programme in applied strategic reasoning. It is not medical advice and is not a substitute for professional guidance. Every framework it draws on is referenced to peer-reviewed literature for educational context only.

Questions, answered

How much time does this take?

The Game Theory Protocol runs 90 days across 12 themed weeks. Each day asks for between 10 and 15 minutes of deliberate practice — the daily tasks are listed in the programme map on this page, so you can read the whole arc before you start.

How does the programme adapt to my week?

A weekly check-in reads the week you actually logged — not the week the plan assumed. Depending on the week you actually had, it lands on one of 5 adjustments: Consolidation week; Add one mapping session; Slow down and revisit; Ready for the next layer; On track. Milestone reviews at day 30, day 60, day 90 read your whole record so far.

Where is my progress stored?

Entirely in this browser. Your daily log, notes, and check-ins live in local storage on this device — no account, no server, and nothing you type is transmitted. You can export your full log as a CSV file or delete everything, at any time, from the My log tab.

Is this medical advice?

No. This is a structured, educational programme built on peer-reviewed research — it is not medical advice, therapy, or a substitute for professional guidance. The full disclaimer, and every framework the programme draws on with its DOI, is on this page.

What happens if I miss days?

The programme is built to absorb real weeks. The weekly check-in works from whatever you logged: a thin week adjusts the plan rather than failing you, and no adjustment ever deletes your record. The adaptation rules above describe exactly how each kind of week is handled.

Where does the evidence come from?

Every phase of the programme is grounded in 6 evidence frameworks — 11 peer-reviewed references in total, each cited with its DOI in the evidence section on this page and verified against the Crossref registry at build time. Where the evidence has honest limits, the framework says so.

Go deeper

Hand-picked companions to this programme from across the estate — the baseline tool, the research deep dives, and the terms worth two minutes each.

assessment The Game Theory Assessment A baseline reading before day 1 — retake it after the programme and compare.
glossary Prisoner's Dilemma The defining game-theory scenario this programme drills.
glossary Nash Equilibrium The no-unilateral-improvement idea behind stable strategies.
glossary Tit-for-Tat Axelrod's winning strategy in the iterated tournaments.

Programme record

A living programme keeps a public record. Any future change to the daily tasks, the check-in rules, or their thresholds bumps the version and lands here.

v1.0 · July 2026Initial published programme: 90 daily practices across three phases, weekly adaptive check-ins, and milestone reviews at days 30, 60 and 90.